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SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [CY](#) [GE](#)

SUBJECT: CYPRUS TRIES TO MAINTAIN "BALANCED APPROACH" TO
GEORGIAN PROBLEM

REF: A. SECSTATE 93264

[1](#)B. LJUBLJANA 398

[1](#)C. STOCKHOLM 607

Classified By: Political Section Chief Gregory Macris, Reason 1.4 (b)

[1](#)1. (SBU) Per Ref A, PolOff on September 4 demarched MFA European Division diplomat Nikos Panayiotou regarding the upcoming Gymnich informal meeting of EU foreign ministers, where Georgia would figure high on the agenda. Panayiotou stated that the GoC was trying to maintain a "balanced approach" to the Georgian issue. It favored maintaining that nation's territorial integrity, especially in light of Cyprus's own internal situation, and said that a violation of territorial integrity was a violation of the international system.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Panayiotou confirmed that the EU was considering sending an ESDP monitoring mission, likely civilian, to Georgia; a decision would be made at the September 15 GAERC. The decision could go either way, he thought, but he ventured that the ministers eventually would approve the EU monitors. Preparations for standing up and deploying the mission were "moving fast," Panayiotou added, and enjoyed GoC support.

[1](#)3. (SBU) Panayiotou claimed Cyprus did not agree that the EU should conduct a serious review of its relationship with Russia. Relations had "been affected by the Georgia conflict," he concurred, but it was vital that Cyprus and the broader EU keep channels of communication open with Moscow. Continual engagement with Russia would give Brussels greater leverage, while the opposite was true of breaking or downgrading relations.

[1](#)4. (C) Polchief paid a follow-up call on Panayiotou on September 5, since his account had differed widely from reports of other U.S. embassies that Cyprus was holding up ESDP mission consensus with a demand the EU first consult the Russians before deploying (Refs B, C). The MFA diplomat asserted that the GoC had supported a provisional decision at the September 1 special European Council meeting to go forward with the mission and begin conducting preliminary work. Regarding the reports of other U.S. missions, he surmised they perhaps were referring to pre-Council, working-level meetings, where the Cypriots indeed had preached caution, so as not to get out in front of the heads of government. As "proof" that Cyprus was not opposing the mission, he claimed that Political/Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors on September 4 had unanimously approved another mission planning document, the "Crisis Management Concept." Urbancic